

The Ethical Philosophy¹ of Nāṣir-i Khusraw

By
Faquir Muhammad Hunzai, PhD.

The eminent eleventh century sage, author, poet, and traveller, Ḥakīm Nāṣir-i Khusraw, whose full name was Abū Muḥsin Ḥamīd al-Dīn Nāṣir b. Khusraw b. Ḥārith-i Qubādiyānī and Yumgānī was born in 1004 in Qubādiyān and died in Yumgān after 1072. As a result of a vivid dream that forced him to re-evaluate his life and beliefs, he undertook an intense personal search for truth. This search led him to the Fatimid Caliph/Imam al-Mustanṣir bi'llāh (d. 487/1094), the leader of the Ismā'īlīs, whom he accepted as the heir of the Prophet Muḥammad and spiritual guide of Muslims. He dedicated the rest of his life to the propagation of Ismā'īlism.

Nāṣir-i Khusraw was appointed by the Imam as the *ḥujjat-i jazīra-yi Khurāsān*, the 'proof' of the island of Khurasan', or the *ṣāhib-i jazīra-yi Mashriq*, 'the lord of the eastern island'. In the terminology of the Ismā'īlī *da'wa*, or mission, a *ḥujjat* or *ṣāhib-i jazīra* is one of twelve dignitaries who oversee the world's twelve *jazā'ir* (islands, sing. *jazīra*). Even today, centuries after his death, his memory is revered in Badakhshan, Afghanistan, the north western Xinjiang region of China, Chitral, and the Northern Areas of Pakistan, including Gilgit, Puniyal, Ghizr, Yasin, Ishkoman and Hunza. In these areas he is known as Ḥazrat-i Pīr or Sayyid Shāh Nāṣir-i Khusraw.

As one of the twelve *hujjats* under the Imam, Nāṣir was responsible for the propagation of the *da'wa*. The Ismā'īlī *da'wa* was characterized by its harnessing of the intellectual currents of the time and place to guide believers to the recognition of ultimate truth. The intelligentsia during Nāṣir's time were deeply influenced by the translations of Greek philosophy that were now available in Arabic. Thus, Ismā'īlī *dā'īs* used to employ philosophical terminology as a means to convey the Ismā'īlī faith. The best example of this approach is Nāṣir's own *Jāmi' al-Hikmatayn*, in which he first deals with questions in the light of Greek learning and then in the light of *ta'wīl* (esoteric meaning) and *ta'yīd* (spiritual help in the form of enlightenment). Some questioned this approach, feeling that it was the propagation of philosophy under the guise of religion. However, the Ismā'īlī *dā'īs* saw philosophy as merely a tool to gain understanding, and criticised philosophers for their dependence on the potentially inefficient intellects of ordinary, human authors. Nāṣir criticized the conclusions of the philosophers as not more than a spider's web,² indicating his own method of using philosophy only as a means and not an end.

The particular focus of this paper is Nāṣir's ethical philosophy, which forms an integral part of his metaphysical system, in which he combines the wisdom of Islam and Greek philosophy.³ Nāṣir's ethics emphasize the creative and decision-making functions of the human soul, and are a fertile locus to examine the interplay between soul and intellect, and soul and the world. The human soul is the boundary between the physical and spiritual worlds, participating intimately

in each. Thus, it contains within itself the possibility of either damnation or salvation. Damnation results from neglecting the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom, while salvation is attained through acquiring knowledge and wisdom, which lead back to the spiritual world, i.e., to the Universal Soul. This examination will take into account the full corpus of his edited works (*Gushāyish wa Rahāyish*, *Shish Faṣl*, *Jāmi‘ al-Hikmatayn*, *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, *Wajh-i Dīn*, *Zād al-Musāfirīn* and the *Dīwān* of poetry).

Ethical philosophy is a branch of practical philosophy. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūṣī explained that it is concerned:

“With how the human soul can acquire a disposition such that all its acts, proceeding from it by its will, may be fair and praiseworthy. Thus its subject-matter is the human soul, inasmuch as from it can proceed, according to its will, acts fair and praiseworthy, or ugly and to be condemned. This being so, it must first be known what the human soul is, and wherein lie its end and perfection; what are its faculties, by which (if it uses them properly) it attains what it seeks, namely perfection and felicity; what, again, it is that prevents it from reaching that perfection.”⁴

However, the exposition of ethics varies from one school of thought to another. Each school develops its exposition on the basis of its own fundamental principles or its metaphysical system. Since Naṣīr belongs to the Fatimid Ismā‘īlī *da‘wa*, in order to contextualise his exposition, a brief account of the salient characteristics of the *da‘wa* propounded by his colleagues is in order. Among his predecessors, apart from his teacher al-Mu‘ayyad fi’l-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 1078), Naṣīr

seems to have been most impressed by Abū Ya‘qūb Sijistānī (d. after 970) and praises him for his sound views, with the exception of metempsychosis.⁵ In his *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, he translates some of the subjects dealt with in the works of Sijistānī, such as *al-Yanābi‘* and the *Ithbāt al-Nubū‘āt*. However, the Imam of the time was considered the ultimate source of knowledge for both of them, as he was for all the Ismā‘īlī *dā‘īs*.⁶

There are three salient characteristics of the Ismā‘īlī *da‘wa* that distinguish it from other Islamic schools of thought. These are: (1) the concept of the continuity of divine guidance through the cycles of prophethood and then the cycle of Imamāt, which plays the central role in it; (2) the concept of *tanzīl* and *ta’wīl* or *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*, i.e., the exoteric and esoteric aspects of the Divine message, and (3) the *ḥudūd-i dīn* (hierarchy of religion) that exists both in the higher world, with the Pen (*qalam*) or Throne (*‘arsh*), the Tablet (*lawḥ*), or Pedestal (*kursī*), Isrāfīl, Mikā’īl and Jibrīl, as well as in the lower world with the *nāṭiq* (speaking Prophet), *asās* (foundation), Imām (guide), *ḥujjat* (proof), and *dā‘ī* (summoner), who are the counterparts of the *ḥudūd* in the higher world. The *ḥudūd* are like the rungs of a ladder between the higher world and the lower world. It is through them that knowledge descends from higher to lower ranks, thus enabling individual souls to ascend step by step to the higher world.⁷

Further, the concept of *tanzīl* and *ta’wīl* led to the development of a corollary: the relationship between revelation and reason or between theology and philosophy, which at that time was a burning issue among Muslim thinkers, theologians and

philosophers. The philosophers upheld the superiority of reason while the theologians that of revelation. For Ismā‘īlī *dā‘īs*, this controversy did not exist. According to them, the innate intellect (*‘aql-i gharīzī*), is a hidden *rasūl* (messenger) in every human being and the outer Messenger represents the Universal Intellect in the physical world and nourishes the former. As Nāṣir explains in his *Dīwān*:

Khīrad sū-yī insān rasūlī nihānist,

Ba-dil dar nishasta ba-farmān-i Yazdān,

Intellect is a hidden messenger sent to human beings

Sitting in their hearts by the command of God⁸

In his *Khwān al-Ikhwān* he expounds on this as follows:

“Intellect is the (first) proof of God in the creation of human beings. The second proof of God is His messenger to humankind, who actualises the innate intellect that is in potentiality in them, through the Book, *sharī‘a* (Divine law), *ta’wīl* (esoteric interpretation) and *tawḥīd* (knowledge of oneness of God)”.⁹

Sijistānī says that the innate intellect in every individual is the first messenger and the Prophet is the second messenger, who provides intellectual nourishment to the first messenger, the innate intellect, to bring it to perfection through the *sharī‘a* (law),¹⁰ which itself is “an embodied intellect (*‘aqlun mujassam*)”.¹¹ To a particular and incomplete intellect, the exoteric aspect of the *sharī‘a* may appear incompatible with the intellect, but not so to those who know its esoteric aspect

or *ta'wīl*.¹² Thus, the very issue of revelation and reason as two conflicting sources of knowledge does not arise in Ismā'īlī thought.

The emphasis on the primacy of intellect had permeated all aspects of Ismā'īlī thought, including concepts such as reward and punishment and Paradise and Hell, which are directly related to the destination of the human soul. Reward and Paradise are considered to be knowledge of realities, while Punishment and Hell are considered to be the absence of this knowledge; in other words, ignorance.

As the Ismā'īlī *dā'īs* employed Neoplatonic terminology, such as the Universal Intellect and Universal Soul, as equivalent to Quranic terms such as the Pen and the Tablet, it is necessary to briefly describe the Neoplatonic metaphysical system and that of Nāṣir to have a clear perspective of the adaptation of the former by the latter.

In the Neoplatonic metaphysical system, God, often referred to by Plotinus (205-270) as the One, or the Good, is beyond being, thought, reason or language. There is a scale of reality, leading from God down to matter through emanation. The chief steps down from God are *nous* or Intellect (*'aql*), which emanates directly and involuntarily from the One. In intellect's referring back to God emanates the psyche or soul (*nafs*); and its referring back to the intellect emanate matter and form, which constitute the physical world with its spheres, elements (simple and composite), minerals, plants, animals and human beings. The human soul is a part of the psyche or the Universal Soul. It is in part intellect, in part

sensory being, and is distracted by affinities in both directions. Salvation of the human soul is in its communion with and reuniting with God. This is possible to attain through turning to Him with the practice of unselfishness and learning.¹³

Having given a brief account of the Neo-Platonic metaphysical system, let us describe that of Nāṣir-i Khusraw, upon which he based his ethical system.

In Nāṣir's metaphysical system, God is beyond both existence (*ḥastī*) and non-existence (*nāstī*), and beyond reason itself. Therefore, no description or attribute of creatures, whether physical or non-physical (i.e., spiritual) can be ascribed to Him. Nāṣir explains that the creatures did not come into existence through emanation, but rather He brought both the physical and non-physical into existence instantaneously from nothing through His Command (*amr*) "Be (*kun*)", which is also expressed by terms such as Word (*kalima*), Volition (*irāda*), and non-existence (*nāstī*). This act of God is called *ibdā'*, which can be translated as "instantaneous creation" or "*creation ex-nihilo*". The command of God in relation to His ipseity (*ḥuwiyya*) is just a trace (*athar*), like that of the writing of a scribe, and thus it has no relation whatsoever with His ipseity. The first creature that came into existence by His Command was the First or Universal Intellect. Further, since there was no intermediary between the two, the Command joined with the Intellect and they became one. In this system, the Command is the first cause and the Intellect the first effect, but due to the joining of the former with the latter, the Universal Intellect became both the cause and the effect, and thus perfect in every respect in potentiality as well as

actuality. With respect to *ibdā'* in this system, God is called *mubdi'* (Originator) and the Universal Intellect *mubda'* (the Originated). When the First Intellect moved, not in a physical sense but in gratitude to God, the Universal Soul proceeded from it from the Divine Command, which had united with the Intellect. The Universal Soul, which is also called the Second Intellect, was like the Universal Intellect in its being perfect in potentiality, but unlike it due to its being imperfect in actuality. When the Universal Soul moved in order to correct its deficiency or to be like the Universal Intellect, matter and form came into existence. Thus, the Universal Soul created the physical world in order to bring forth the great souls of *nāṭiqs*, *asāses*, Imams and their followers. Thus, the physical world came into existence by the movement of the Universal Soul in order to actualize the souls that are within it in a potential form. This actualization occurs by acquiring knowledge and performing good deeds in the light of divine guidance.¹⁴

A comparison of both systems shows that the Ismā'īlī *dā'īs* have used the Neo-Platonic system but with modifications. The Neo-Platonic system is emanationist, which in the view of the Ismā'īlī *dā'īs*, entails *shirk* or association of creatures with God. Meanwhile, the Ismā'īlī system upholds creation *ex nihilo* by His Command. Also, with respect to the salvation of human souls, in Neo-Platonism the emphasis is on one's individual effort to purify one's soul in order to attain communion or mystical union with God. In Ismā'īlism, although the human soul is given freewill to choose between diligence and negligence and is accountable

for its actions, salvation through one's effort alone without resorting to the divine guidance provided by the Prophets and Imams, is not possible. Further, in Neo-Platonism, communion with God is possible, while in Ismā'īlism, the successful soul returns to the Universal Soul, but communion with God Himself is not possible.

Coming to Nāṣir's ethical philosophy, he extols ethics or good manners (*ḥusn al-khulq, khū-yi nīk*) as the key to the treasure of good (*ganj-i nīkī*), as he says in his *Dīwān*:

*Bar guzīn az kārhā pākīzagī-ū khū-yi nīk,
Kaz hama dunyā guzīn-i khalq-i dunyā īn guzīd.
Nīk-khū guftast Yazdān mar rasūl-i khwīsh-rā,
Khū-yi nīkast ay birādar ganj-i nīkī rā kalīd.*

In your actions, choose purity and beautiful conduct

For from the world entire

This is what was chosen by the Chosen One among all creation

God called His messenger "he of beautiful conduct"

O brother! Beautiful conduct is the key to the treasure of goodness.¹⁵

Ethical philosophy is concerned with the nature of the human soul, how it may acquire virtues to attain perfection (or the second perfection), how it may guard itself from vices. In this regard, we should examine the nature of the soul, its virtues and vices, and their respective consequences in Nāṣir's work.

Nāṣir has discussed the subject of the soul to a greater or lesser degree in all his available works. This is particularly elaborated upon in his *Zād al-Musāfirīn* (*Provision for the Travellers*), in which he discusses its nature, origin (*mabda*) and return (*ma'ād*). In fact, the entire *Zād* is an explanation of the (spiritual) journey of the human soul (*nafs-i mardum*) and its pre-requisites or provisions; hence the title *Zād al-Musāfirīn*. The title implies that if the contents of the book are understood properly, it will provide provisions for the journey of the soul to return to its origin.¹⁶

According to Nāṣir, the human soul is a substance originated instantaneously from nothing (*jawhar-i 'ibdā'ī*); it is immortal and its movement is essential. It is the substratum of abstract forms, capable of producing crafts and receiving knowledge, and it survives after the annihilation of the body.¹⁷ He also expresses the same in his *Dīwān*:

*Ān chīst ki chūn shakhs-i gīrān tū bi-khusbad,
 Bīnā wa sukhan-gūy hamī mānad-ū bīdār.
 Ān gawhar-i zindast-ū pazīrā-yi 'ulūmast,
 Zū zinda-ū gūyanda shudast īn tan-i murdār.*

While your heavy body sleeps, what is it
 That remains seeing, speaking and awake?
 It is a substance that lives and learns
 By which this corpse has become living and speaking.¹⁸

The human soul has come to this world from the Universal Soul as a traveller. That is to say, the human soul is not meant to remain here forever; it has to accomplish a certain task, which is the acquisition of knowledge.

Nāṣir further elaborates the position of soul and the difficulties it faces in accomplishing its task. He says that although its origin is the higher world, it does not have a form of its own. Rather, it is susceptible to any impression of good or evil, beautiful or ugly. This determines its form. He says that the position of the human soul, which is part (*juzw*) of the Universal Soul, when it comes to this world, is like a substance that is prone to accept any attribute or accident. It is like a piece of white paper. If it reaches the hand of a pious sage, it will be enhanced with knowledge and wisdom, and if it falls into the clutches of a mischievous ignoramus, will be defiled by insolence and idiocy.¹⁹

The human soul therefore requires protection from vices that deform and disfigure it, and the inculcation of virtues that transform it into a form that pleases the Universal Soul.

How can virtues be acquired and vices avoided? According to Nāṣir, the human soul is endowed with two faculties or powers: one is in the innate intellect (*'aql-i gharīzī*), which comes from the Universal Intellect and is associated with the faculty of knowledge (*quwwat-i 'ilm*). The second is the body, which is from the Universal Body; in other words the physical world from which comes the power or faculty of action (*quwwat-i fi'l*).²⁰ Nāṣir says that the soul, which constantly

uses both these powers, is an angelic soul.²¹ As for vices, according to Nāṣir, since evil does not exist in *ibdā'*;²² the existence of both the Universal Intellect and the physical world is good. The physical world is not due to any defect or weakness. Thus, unlike virtues, vices do not have a permanent existence. However, vices are created when the two powers that were given it to create virtues are neglected. Thus, according to Nāṣir, the soul that does not use these two powers turns into a bestial soul.²³ Vices are like a disease. If cured, the disease will disappear, but if not cured in time, it can be fatal. In the same way, if vices are replaced by virtues, they disappear; but if they are not removed before the departure of the soul from this physical world, they become ineradicable and cause lasting torment and remorse. Virtues are acquired by using the faculties of knowledge and action, while vices are caused by neglecting these faculties. The former attitude of the soul is considered gratitude while the latter is ingratitude to His favour of granting it these faculties.²⁴

With respect to external means, we have already seen that the innate intellect, which is the internal or the first messenger, cannot reach perfection without the teaching of the external or the second messenger, who is the prophet. According to Nāṣir, when the soul initially comes to the world, it is in a potential and imperfect form. Although the human soul is granted the gift of the innate intellect *in potentia* to discern between right and wrong, because it is incomplete, it cannot rightly decide on its own. Thus, the Wise Maker, the Universal Soul, has especially helped and guided certain souls. These souls are called

mu'ayyadūn, and bring down the message of the Wise Maker concerning what to know and how to act.²⁵

According to Nāṣir, there are two categories of *mu'ayyads*, each performing a particular function to facilitate the human soul's understanding of the message by degrees (*tadrīj*). There are *mu'ayyads* who bring the message from the spiritual world to the physical world using allegories and parables (*amthāl*). They are called *aṣḥāb-i tanzīl* (custodians of revelation or *nuṭaqā* – pl. of *nāṭiq*). There are also *mu'ayyads* who decode the allegories and parables and lead their followers to the spiritual realities (*mamthūlāt*). These are called *aṣḥāb-i ta'wīl* (custodians of inner meanings or *usus* pl. of *asās* and *a'imma* pl. of *Imām*). According to Nāṣir, *tanzīl*, which literally means 'bringing down' the message, does not occur in any physical sense. Rather, it means to clothe the realities, which are revealed to the *nāṭiq*'s heart, in the language of the people to whom he conveys the message (Q. 2:97; 26:193-195).²⁶ Since spiritual realities are expressed in physical language, this process is also called *takthīf*, which literally means to make the subtle (spiritual) dense (physical). Similarly, *ta'wīl*, which literally means to take something back to its *awwal* or origin, is not meant in any physical sense. Rather, it is explaining the meanings or realities of the parables and allegories expressed in physical language. *Ta'wīl* is also called *talṭīf*, which literally means to make the dense (physical) subtle (spiritual).²⁷

The specially inspired and guided souls who actualise and perfect potential and imperfect souls are the means of knowledge and action. The message from the

spiritual world is compiled in the form of the Book and the *sharī'a*. Here arises a question about the bilateral relationship of knowledge and action. If the human soul in the spiritual world needs only knowledge, what then is the significance of action? According to Nāṣir, undoubtedly the ultimate end is knowledge, but knowledge itself cannot be actualised in the human soul without action. To demonstrate what he means by this, he uses the example of a piece of steel and flint. Although a spark is latent in the steel, it cannot appear without striking the two together. In the same way, without using physical limbs in obedience to God, knowledge is not actualised in the human soul. Thus, according to him, they go hand in hand. He says in his *Dīwān*:

Tā 'ilm na-yāmūzī nīkī na-tawān kard,

Bī sīm na-yāyad dīram-ū bī zar dīnār.

Wānkū na-kunad ṭā'at 'ilmash na-buwad 'ilm,

Zargar na-buwad mard chū bar zar na-kunad kār.

Until you acquire knowledge you cannot do good,

A *dīram* cannot come into being without silver nor a *dīnār* without gold.

The knowledge of one who acts not in piety is not true knowledge

Nobody can be a goldsmith without working on gold.²⁸

Thus, according to Nāṣir, in the physical world neither knowledge nor action is possible without the other. The correct form of knowledge and action depends on the *mu'ayyadūn*, who have compiled this information in the Book and the *sharī'a*.

While Nāṣir emphasizes that in the physical world action is necessary for the development and perfection of the human soul, he makes a distinction in the two types of practices of *sharī'a*. He divides the *sharī'a* into intellectual (*'aqlī*) and positional or statutory (*wad'ī*). The intellectual *sharī'a* is always necessary to maintain the order and discipline of society. Meanwhile the statutory *sharī'a* is a temporary measure that conceals certain realities (*ḥaqā'iq*) that cannot be openly revealed due to the unfavourable time. When the time becomes favourable, these devices are no longer necessary. He compares this to a physician imposing certain restrictions on his sick patients, forcing them to eat bitter and unpleasant medicines and a particular diet on the one hand, while preventing them from that which is detrimental on the other. But when they recover, they are liberated from the restrictions. Nonetheless, actions that are explicitly based on the intellect are necessary to attain perfection.²⁹

This brings us to ask about the ultimate end of the journey of the human soul, namely the nature of reward and Paradise, punishment and Hell, both of which are so graphically described in the Qur'ān.

According to Nāṣir, pleasure and pain may be either physical or spiritual. Physical pleasures are transitory and of lower value. They fulfil the physical needs of human beings, such as eating and drinking. Spiritual pleasures are permanent and of a higher value. They fulfil the spiritual needs of a human soul and are in the form of knowledge and wisdom. Regarding their relative values, he says that if we eat too much physical food, its taste decreases, but the deeper the

knowledge of a subject we acquire, the greater its pleasure. From this, he infers that the higher world is the permanent world where the soul will never lose the pleasure due to constant contemplation on knowledge and wisdom. But had paradise consisted of physical pleasure, the soul would have lost the pleasure because of constant usage. Thus, Nāṣir holds that when the soul leaves the physical body, the reward that leads to paradise is in the form of knowledge. Paradise is firstly the Universal Soul and then ultimately the Universal Intellect, together with the Divine Command.³⁰ The physical pleasures in this world are symbols (*amthāl*) to persuade us to strive for higher pleasures, which are real and lasting (*mamthūlāt*). In this respect they play an important role in teaching the human soul, but they are not the ends in themselves.

Similarly, punishment and Hell are contrasted with reward and Paradise. Physical pain is temporary, but eternal pain is in the form of ignorance. The torment of the remorse of not achieving knowledge is far greater than any physical pain and Hell is the remorse of remaining away from the Paradise of knowledge of the Universal Soul and the Universal Intellect.³¹ According to Nāṣir these two states of the human soul can partially be experienced in this life. He says:

*‘Adam khwābast-ū bīdārī ba-nazd-i ‘āqilān hastī,
Iram dān khātīr-i dānā wa dūzakh sīna-yi nādān,*

According to the wise, sleep is non-existence and wakefulness is life,
Know that the heart of a wise person is Paradise and that of an
ignorant one is Hell.³²

In sum, Nāṣir-i Khusraw's ethical philosophy, which leads the human soul to its perfection, is based on revelation. Revelation itself is compiled on the basis of the principles of the Universal Intellect. In the physical world the Universal Intellect manifests in the Prophet, about whose absolute authority God says: "And whatsoever the Messenger gives you take it. And whatsoever he forbids, abstain from it." (Q. 59:7)³³ This verse shows that the Prophet's command surpasses every principle in religion, even the intellectual and universal ones, because he is like a physician, who in ordinary circumstances forbids people from imbibing poison, but in some instances prescribes it as a cure. In the same way, the Prophet may command something that appears unacceptable according to the standards of the incomplete human intellect; however, his every command is underpinned by the welfare of humanity. This is also the position of the Prophet's successor after him. This paper has attempted to elaborate that this is the quintessence of Nāṣir's ethical philosophy.

¹ Here the word 'philosophy' is used in the original sense of "love for wisdom", not that Nāṣir-i Khusraw belonged to a particular school of philosophy. Wisdom according to him belongs to the Prophets from whom the philosophers borrowed it and attributed to themselves mixing it with their own ideas. Thus, Nāṣir says that in the philosophers' writings the original wisdom is lost and only the traces remain. The real wisdom has continued in the chain of Prophets and Imams (*Jāmi' al-Hikmatayn*, pp 6-18). He says in his *Dīwān*:

Hikmat az ḥaḍrat-i farzand-i nabī bāyad just

Pāk-ū pākiza zi tashbīh-ū zi ta'ṭil chū sīm

Wisdom must be sought from the presence of the Prophet's son
Unsullied and free from *tashbīh* (anthropomorphism) and *ta'ṭil* (rejection
of the existence of God) (*Dīwān*, p. 356)

² Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Zād al-Musāfirīn*, ed. Badhl al-Raḥmān (Berlin, 1923), p. 151.

³ Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Jāmi' al-Ḥikmatayn*, ed. H. Corbin and M. Mu'īn (Tehran-Paris, 1953), pp. 7-18.

⁴ Tūsī, Naṣir al-Dīn. *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, ed. M. Mīnuwī and 'A. Ḥaydarī (Tehran, 1977), p. 48, read: *ghāyat wa kamāl* instead of *ghāyat-i kamāl*. *The Nasirean Ethics*, tr. G.M. Wickens, (London, 1964), p. 35.

⁵ Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, ed. 'A. Qawīm (Tehran, 1959), p. 133; *Zād al-Musāfirīn*, pp. 421-22.

⁶ Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Wajh-i Dīn*, ed. Gh. R. Aavani, (Tehran, 1977), p. 341; Sijistānī, Abū Ya'qūb. *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, ed. H. Corbin (Tehran-Paris, 1949), pp. 2-3; Kirmānī, Ḥamīd al-Dīn. *Rāḥat al-'Aql*, ed. M.K. Ḥusayn and M.M. Ḥilmī (Cairo, 1952), p. 20.

⁷ *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, pp. 199-206.

⁸ Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Dīwān*, ed. Naṣr Allāh Taqawī (Tehran, 1966), p. 320; M. Mīnuwī and M. Muhaqqiq (Tehran, 1974), p. 84; *Jāmi' al-Ḥikmatayn*, pp. 154-55.

⁹ *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, pp. 29, 75-77.

¹⁰ Sijistānī, Abū Ya'qūb. *Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt*, ed. 'A. Tāmīr (Beirut, 1982), p. 47.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹² *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, pp. 75-58; *Ithbāt al-Nubū'āt*, pp. 51-53.

¹³ Daftary, F. *The Ismā'īlīs: Their History and Doctrines* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 240-42; Russell B., *History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1991), pp. 292-98; Avey, A.V., *Handbook in the History of Philosophy* (New York, 1968), pp. 61-62.

¹⁴ Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Shish Faṣl*, ed. and tr. W. Ivanow, (Cairo, 1948), pp. 10-20.

¹⁵ *Dīwān* (Mīnuwī), p. 52.

¹⁶ *Zād al-Musāfirīn*, p. 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 64, 71.

¹⁸ *Dīwān* (Mīnuwī), p. 378.

¹⁹ *Zād al-Musāfirīn*, p. 303.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

²² *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, pp. 183-86.

²³ *Zād al-Musāfirīn*, p. 310.

²⁴ *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, p. 29.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-74. Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Gushāyish wa Rahāyish*, Hunzai, F. M. (London, 1998), p. 65.

²⁶ *Zād al-Musāfirīn*, p. 27.

²⁷ Nāṣir-i Khusraw, *Gushāyish wa Rahāyish*, Hunzai, F. M. (London, 1998), p. 65.

²⁸ *Dīwān* (Mīnuwī), p. 165. *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, pp. 280-285.

²⁹ *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, pp. 280-85.

³⁰ *Wajh-i Dīn*, pp. 33-48.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-59; *Khwān al-Ikhwān*, pp.167-69.

³² *Dīwān*, p. 357.

³³ *Wajh-i Dīn* (Taqawī), p. 291.

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Shafique N. Virani of Toronto University for his valuable suggestions and help.